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1. Introduction 
According to Noam Chomsky, speakers of a language 
have a substantial body of propositional knowledge of that 
language that they draw upon in language production and 
comprehension. Since the late 1950s Chomsky’s project 
has been to characterise that knowledge and give an 
account of its acquisition. Arguably, one of the most 
powerful philosophical challenges to Chomsky’s output is 
generated by the rule following considerations of Philoso-
phical Investigations §§ 138-242. My aim in this paper is to 
characterise the nature of this challenge, a topic that, 
rather surprisingly, has received relatively little attention in 
the philosophical literature. 
2. Chomsky and the problem of  
rule-following 
Despite significant changes in his position over the last 
forty years, Chomsky’s core ideas have remained con-
stant. His central idea is that we have a body of knowledge 
of language, a body of knowledge that we draw upon in 
producing and comprehending sentences and which 
allows us to routinely produce novel sentences and 
understand sentences that we have never encountered 
before. This is a species of propositional knowledge rather 
than a skill or ability. The particular body of knowledge that 
an individual has of her language will be rich and multifac-
eted. It will include lexical, phonological and syntactic 
knowledge. Chomsky has been primarily concerned with 
our knowledge of syntax and I will focus on his views of 
syntax in what follows. This syntactic knowledge includes 
rules for constructing phrases and sentences and rules for 
transforming sentences (for example, passives into actives 
and declarative sentences into questions). Prominent 
examples of rules that Chomsky has claimed are known by 
speakers of English include the following: (a) the head of a 
phrase comes before its complement (Chomsky, 1986); (b) 
an anaphor is bound in a local domain (Chomsky, 1986); 
and (c) a question can be derived from a declarative 
sentence by moving the auxiliary immediately following the 
subject to the front of the sentence (Chomsky, 1988). An 
important point about such rules is that our knowledge of 
them is conceived as being unconscious or tacit so that a 
typical speaker is unable to state the rules that underlie 
her linguistic behaviour. Moreover, there is an important 
distinction between competence and performance (Chom-
sky, 1965). An individual’s competence is her knowledge 
of language. Her linguistic performance will not perfectly 
reflect this competence. For example, due to time or 
memory limitations she might reject as ungrammatical a 
perfectly legitimate sentence of her language or be unable 
to make any firm judgement as to the grammaticality of 
such a sentence. 
In the rule-following considerations Wittgenstein’s atten-
tion focuses on what might be called the problem of rule-
following. This problem is constituted by the following 
questions. How is it possible to grasp a rule or for one’s 
activities to be governed by a particular rule? What 
determines the demands of the rules governing an individ-
ual’s activities or, alternatively, what determines the iden-
tity of those rules? Given Chomsky’s commitment to our 
having knowledge of syntactic rules, he is faced with 
versions of these very questions. How can an individual 
know or grasp a particular syntactic rule or be governed by 
that rule especially when the demands of the rule will far 
outstrip her linguistic performance? What determines 
which syntactic rules belong to an individual’s language or 
what those rules demand?  
The existence of the problem of rule-following need not 
in itself cause the Chomskian any great worries. The 
problem only becomes a genuine cause for concern if 
there is reason for thinking that the Chomskian is distin-
guished from advocates of alternative visions of language 
in not having access to the resources needed to solve the 
problem. So the question that arises is this: are there 
reasons to think that the Chomskian is peculiarly ill-
equipped to solve the problem, so ill-equipped as to imply 
that it is impossible for the rules that Chomsky identifies to 
belong to an individual’s language, or be known by her? 
My claim is that the rule-following considerations contains 
an explicit line of thought that does indeed threaten to 
deliver an affirmative answer to this question. 
3. The challenge of the rule-following 
considerations 
Mentalism is the view that the mind is an inner theatre 
within which mental phenomena reside. Mental phenom-
ena are thus set apart from the world beyond the individ-
ual’s outer surfaces and lie behind her observable behav-
iour, typically causing that behaviour. Chomsky is explicit 
in his commitment to mentalism. For him, to describe the 
mind is to describe the brain at a higher level of abstrac-
tion and the rules of an individual’s language are encoded 
or represented in her mind-brain and have no existence 
outside of that system. Thus, what an individual knows 
about her language is a matter of what is represented in 
her mind-brain. (See Chomsky, 2000, for a recent state-
ment of this point of view.) 
A hostility to mentalism is one of the major themes of 
Wittgenstein’s later work. A significant part of the rule-
following considerations comprises of an attack on men-
talist attempts to solve the problem of rule-following. One 
such attempt involves an appeal to interpretations and this 
attempt resembles Chomsky’s view of the rules of lan-
guage in such a way as to imply that Wittgenstein’s critique 
of it directly impacts upon Chomsky. In order to substanti-
ate this claim I shall begin by rehearsing Wittgenstein’s 
critique of the appeal to interpretations. 
In Philosophical Investigations § 201 Wittgenstein writes 
‘we ought to restrict the term “interpretation” to the substi-
tution of one expression of the rule for another.’ Hence, 
when an individual interprets a rule she entertains some 
expression of that rule in her mind. Now consider the 
familiar example of an individual being instructed to 
continue the numerical series 2, 4, 6, 8 according to the 
rule ‘+2’. There are any number of different ways in which 
the rule that the individual is instructed to follow could be 
interpreted. However the series is continued there is some 
way of interpreting the rule such that that continuation is 




correct or in accord with the rule. For example, there is a 
way of interpreting the rule so that 1002 immediately 
follows 1000 and, equally, there is a way of interpreting it 
so that 1004 immediately follows 1000. Interpretations 
mediate the link between a rule and its correct applica-
tions. Without such a mediating link anything and every-
thing, and therefore nothing, would be in accord with the 
rule. Suppose that the individual interprets the rule such 
that 1004 immediately follows 1000 and, acting on that 
interpretation, she writes ‘1004’ immediately after ‘1000.’ 
Then she has continued the series correctly on her 
interpretation of the rule. Insofar as she has made a 
mistake this is because her interpretation is not in line with 
that of the individual who laid down the instruction to 
continue the series in accord with the rule ‘+2’ in which 
case she has failed to grasp the relevant rule. All this 
suggests the following answer to the problem of rule-
following. Grasping a rule is a matter of providing an 
interpretation of the target rule; no interpretation, no 
grasping. What determines the demands of the rules that 
govern an individual’s behaviour or the identity of those 
rules are her interpretations of them. In short, what 
connects an individual to a rule that makes determinate 
demands on how she behaves in circumstances that she 
might encounter is an interpretation of the rule, an expres-
sion of that rule existing in her mind. 
Wittgenstein’s objection to this appeal to interpretations 
echoes a complaint he frequently directs at mentalistic 
moves: the appeal gets us nowhere as it is either circular 
or threatens infinite regress. What determines the de-
mands of an individual’s interpretation of a rule or the rule 
under that interpretation? Given that when an individual 
interprets a rule she provides an expression of that rule, 
that expression, or what she does in interpreting the rule, 
is as open to interpretation and as much in need of 
interpretation as the rule itself. If there is a problem that 
interpretations are needed to solve then precisely that 
problem arises in connection with interpretations. For 
anything is in accord with a rule under a given interpreta-
tion on some interpretation of that interpretation. All this is 
brought out in Philosophical Investigations § 201 when 
Wittgenstein writes: 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be 
determined by a rule, because every course of action 
can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer 
was: if everything can be made out to accord with the 
rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And 
so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. 
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from 
the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give 
one interpretation after another; as if each contented us at 
least for a moment, until we thought of yet another stand-
ing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of 
grasping a rule that is not an interpretation, but which is 
exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going 
against it” in actual cases. 
Wittgenstein’s point here is that we get the paradoxical 
conclusion that there is no such thing as rule-following if 
we invoke interpretations to solve the problem of rule-
following. For, interpretations alone cannot connect us to 
rules that place determinate demands on us as their 
significance is as up in the air and in need of interpretation 
as that of the rules that they are invoked to interpret. 
Chomsky isn’t explicitly concerned with solving Wittgen-
stein’s problem of rule-following and he doesn’t invoke the 
term ‘interpretation’ in accounting for our knowledge of 
language. Nevertheless, I think there are close enough 
parallels between the appeal to interpretations in attempt-
ing to solve the problem of rule-following and Chomsky’s 
core claims to imply that Wittgenstein’s attack on the 
former equally applies to the latter. To see why, consider 
the following. 
Chomsky is an unabashed mentalist who believes that 
the identity of the rules belonging to an individual’s lan-
guage is determined by how things are in her mind-brain. 
Thus, his implied answer to the question of how it is 
possible for an individual to grasp a linguistic rule and that 
of what determines the demands of the rules of her 
language or the identity of those rules involves an appeal 
to the state or contents of her mind-brain. More precisely, 
Chomsky holds that the rules of an individual’s language 
are encoded or represented in her mind-brain in a manner 
analogous to that in which information is encoded in a 
computer and the rules have no existence independent of 
that representation. Such representations are causally 
implicated in language comprehension and production. 
(Chomsky offers one of the most explicit statements of this 
line of thought in his 1980.)  
It should be clear that Chomsky’s representations of 
rules are analogous to the interpretations that Wittgenstein 
discuses. Both exist in the mind, constitute an individual’s 
grasp of the rules that she grasps and serve to determine 
the demands or the identity of those rules. Consequently, 
Chomsky is faced with a version of the challenge that 
Wittgenstein directs at the advocate of interpretations. That 
challenge can be characterised in the following terms. 
Mental representations of linguistic rules are invoked to 
explain how it is possible for an individual to grasp or know 
the rules of her language. These mental entities are 
conceived as being such as to determine the demands or 
the identity of those rules. For example, they are supposed 
to be such as to determine which collections of words are 
grammatical (and so can legitimately be produced by the 
individual when engaged in linguistic activity) and which 
are not (and so ought not be produced and ought be 
rejected as ungrammatical). But how can these mental 
representations play that role? For, the very questions that 
they were invoked to answer arise in connection with them. 
What determines the demands or the identity of the rules 
represented in the individual’s mind-brain as those repre-
sentations can be interpreted in many disparate ways. 
Suppose that a representation of a rule is causally impli-
cated in the individual’s producing a particular collection of 
words in a linguistic interchange. Did she produce a 
sentence of her language, did she apply the rule as 
represented in her head correctly? Just as the representa-
tion can be interpreted so as to deliver an affirmative 
answer to this question, it can equally be interpreted to 
deliver a negative answer. What Chomsky needs to do is 
provide some principled reason for preferring one of the 
competing interpretations of the representation over all the 
others and that reason had better not give rise to the same 
problem all over again one step further down the line. 
4. Conclusion 
Wittgenstein’s attack on the appeal to interpretations 
generates an analogous challenge to Chomsky’s attribu-
tion to speakers of mentally represented rules. Meeting 
that challenge involves explaining in such a way as to 
avoid circularity or infinite regress, how an individual’s 
linguistic behaviour could be governed by determinate 
linguistic rules and how she could know such rules in virtue 
of the state of her mind-brain. Despite the power of this 
challenge, I am optimistic that it can be met by developing 
the following idea. What rules are represented in an 




individual’s mind-brain is a matter of the nature of the 
causal structures underlying her linguistic behaviour and 
the generalisations concerning linguistic behaviour that 
they ground. Developing this idea is a project for another 
day and one that faces several prominent obstacles. For 
example, there are the objections that Kripke (1982) 
directs at dispositionalism and the problem of squaring the 
idea with the competence-performance distinction. 
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